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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CREDIBILITY:
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
Mason Laddt
The author presents the determination of credibility as a multiple process
in which many truth testing devices must be combined, since many diver-
sified factors join together in bringing to light the quality of the witness,
the accuracy of his perceptions, and the worth of his testimony. The author
emphasizes the skills and techniques required in using different types of
impeachment testimony and also gives critical consideration to some of the
existing rules of evidence relating to credibility, with a forecast as to
future development. He concludes that final reliance must be placed upon
the imagination, resourcefulness, experience, and ability of lawyers to
bring out in the setting of the trial the strength and weakness of witnesses
so that the triers may evaluate the true worth of their testimony.
Credibility of witnesses and evaluation of their testimony will always
present critical problems difficult to solve in the trial court. Improved
rules of evidence will give greater freedom to counsel in their attack upon
the problem, but they cannot eliminate the difficulties of proof, for these
difficulties vary with each factual situation and with each witness. If a
perfect substantive law could be assumed and a perfected system of trials
established, it might appear that these difficulties would be solved. Un-
fortunately, such would not be the case. As long as human beings are
subject to error in perception and communication, failure of memory, and
the willingness on the part of some to falsify whenever there is sufficient
motivation, trials will require skills and techniques in the use of the law
of evidence for solution of disputed questions of fact.
The present trend toward letting in more evidence and enlarging the
competency of witnesses has the advantage of giving the triers all of the
evidence which will be helpful to a solution, but it does not answer the
question of whether a witness is mistaken or intentionally falsifying.'
Under modern statutes, every person is qualified as a witness if he is
capable of expressing himself concerning a matter so as to be understood
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and has the capacity to understand the duty to tell the truth.2 Neverthe-
less, one remaining vestige of earlier disqualification because of interest
is still found in most states, namely, the rule of incompetency to testify
in an action against the estate of a deceased person. Except for this rule,
which is in need of revision, other limitations are proper qualifications
essential to give meaningful testimony. The function of a witness is to
communicate matters of his personal knowledge. Therefore, to testify as a
witness, a person must have witnessed the thing about which he testifies
and must have the capacity to perceive and to recollect what he perceived.4
The value of his testimony depends in a large measure upon his oppor-
tunity to observe and his capacity to observe accurately, to remember,
and to communicate in such a way that the triers of fact may know what
actually happened. It is the quality of the witness, the circumstances
surrounding his opportunity for observation, and the many variable fac-
tors which influence his perception that indicate the reliability of the testi-
mony which he gives.5
2 See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 700-02 (effective Jan. 1, 1967); Supreme Court of New
Jersey Rules of Evidence 17-22 (codified with N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-1-32 (Supp.
1965)). These New Jersey Rules are the same as the corresponding provisions of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 9A U.LA. 606-08 (1969). See also Orfield, "Competency of Witnesses in Federal
Criminal Cases," 46 Marq. L. Rev. 324 (1963); Rowley, "The Competency of Witnesses,"
24 Iowa L. Rev. 482 (1939). With the removal of common-law incompetencies, the things
which formerly precluded a witness from testifying may be used to test his credibility.
3 See McCormick, Evidence § 65 (1954) and the authorities cited in note 83 infra.
4 The Uniform Rules of Evidence have set a pattern for the statement of the require-
ment of personal knowledge which has been substantially followed in recent legislation.
Uniform Rule 19 provides:
As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness on a relevant or material matter,
there must be evidence that he has personal knowledge thereof, or experience, train-
ing or education if such be required. Such evidence may be by the testimony of the
witness himself. The judge may reject the testimony of a witness that he perceived
a matter if he finds that no trier of fact could reasonably believe that the witness
did perceive the matter. The judge may receive conditionally the testimony of the
witness as to a relevant or material matter, subject to the evidence of knowledge,
experience, training or education being later supplied in the course of the trial.
Rule 19 must be considered in connection with rule 17, which disqualifies witnesses in-
capable of communicating or understanding the duty to tell the truth, and rule 7 which
makes every person qualified to be a witness subject to rules 17 and 19.
6 For a most enlightening and practical discussion of the multifold elements involved
in judging credibility, see Judge Medina's opinion in the Communist Conspiracy Case,
United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 388-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). He comments:
By what yardstick and in accordance with what rules of law are you to judge the
credibility of the witnesses . ..?
This judging of testimony is very like what goes on in real life. People may tell
you things which may or may not influence some important decisions on your part.
You consider whether the people you deal with had the capacity and the opportunity
to observe or be familiar with and to remember the things they tell you about. You
consider any possible interest they may have, and any bias or prejudice. You consider
a person's demeanor, to use a colloquial expression, you "size him up" when he tells
you anything; you decide whether he strikes you as fair and candid or not. Then
you consider the inherent believability of what he says, whether it accords with your
own knowledge or experience. It is the same thing with witnesses. You ask yourself
if they know what they are talking about. You watch them on the stand as they
testify and note their demeanor. You decide how their testimony strikes you.
Id. at 388.
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Credibility is sometimes thought to involve only a question of the
truthfulness of a witness or of his intentional false swearing, but this over-
looks the many other causes for the unreliability of testimony. In addition,
there are many degrees and kinds of intentional falsification. They vary
from the testimony of the witness who knows enough about the facts to
enlarge upon them with convincing effect, to the witness whose skill is in
deceptive distortion, to the witness who has no knowledge about the facts
but who, through complete invention, testifies to whatever is needed as
proof in the case. The frequent plausibility of the testimony makes detec-
tion of false swearing difficult.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In a direct attack upon the credibility of a witness believed to be giving
perjured testimony, the evidence used is generic in character and designed
to show the general propensity of a witness to falsify, From this the triers
of fact may draw the inference that the particular testimony in question
is false.6 This type of truth testing is directed to the character of the
witness and to his honesty and veracityJ In effect, it is designed to show
that the conscience of the witness would not be disturbed if he falsified.
Thus, a witness may be competent to testify because he recognizes the
legal duty to tell the truth, but he may lack the traits of character which
would cause him to do so if there is some advantage to be gained by
falsifying.
Falsification by such a mendacious witness may be expected, but it does
not always occur and, unless there is some motive for the falsification,
6 For basic principles in the use of character evidence, see Ladd, "Techniques and Theory
of Character Testimony," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 498 (1939).
7 There is much confusion as to the type of character evidence which may be used
to attack credibility, but a consideration of this is not the subject of this article. Comment
is made, however, to point out some of the variations regarding the selection of traits of
which proof may be given. "Truth and veracity" as descriptive of the trait used for
impeachment is common everywhere and in some jurisdictions is the only trait upon which
proof by reputation may be given to challenge truthfulness. United States v. Walker, 313
F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1963); Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965). Uniform Rule 22(c) limits inquiry to the traits of honesty or veracity or their oppo-
sites. This designation is practical in that it is easily understood and includes the qualities
logically associated with the question of a person's truthfulness. In a few jurisdictions, general
moral character is permitted as a means of proof. This is objectionable as not being suffi-
ciently informative for truth testing and if used against the accused as a witness in a
criminal case, may be misapplied to provide a basis for inferring that he probably com-
mitted the crime. For an informative case, see State v. Teager, .222 Iowa 391, 397-98,
269 N.W. 348, 351 (1936). Compare State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 1159-60, 270 N.W.
874, 881 (1937) in which a question calling for character as to honesty, integrity, and
good citizenship was held to be bad. In State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 894-900, 87 S.W.2d
175, 180-84 (1935), the Missouri court changed its former holdings which had permitted
the use of general moral character to impeach credibility and pointed out the dangers of
this broad use. For discussion of this problem, see Ladd, "Credibility Tests-Current
Trends," 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 184-87 (1940). See also Curley, "Reputation of a Witness
for Truth and Veracity in Civil and Criminal Cases," 46 Marq. L. Rev. 353 (1963).
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perhaps it seldom occurs.' A witness who has been previously convicted of
a felony involving dishonesty and false swearing may have very keen per-
ception and the ability to communicate what he has observed. Without a
reason to falsify, his testimony may be worth much more than that of a
witness whose character qualifications are good but who has limitations
upon his ability to perceive, or whose testimony is unconsciously influ-
enced by the past experiences in his life or by associations which have
created a biased perspective.
The current trend of improvements in the law, permitting opinion as
well as reputation testimony as a means of proof of character but confining
this testimony to traits indicating honesty and veracity or their opposites,
provides a realistic method for permitting character evidence to perform
its truth-testing function more effectively.' Likewise, the limitation of the
use, for the purpose of impairing credibility, of evidence that a witness
has been convicted of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement will
prevent much of the abuse occurring in regard to this kind of testimony
and make such testimony more meaningful to the triers of fact.
SCOPE OF "CREDIBILITY TESTING
The problems of credibility involve much more than direct attacks upon
the character of witnesses to discover intentional falsification. Rather they
involve everything relating to a witness which discloses the probability of
accuracy or error in his testimony. 0 Therefore, credibility testing is
directed to the diversified factors which enable the triers of fact intelli-
gently to estimate the value of the testimony by judging the quality of
the witness who gave it and his opportunity to know the facts. For
example, mental deficiencies of a witness are considered in determining
credibility.1 Similarly, intoxication at the time of observing reported
events is recognized as affecting the capacity of a witness to correctly re-
8 Cf. Gates v. Kelly, 15 NID. 639, 110 N.W. 770 (1906).
9 See Uniform Rules of Evidence 21, 22(c).
10 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 229; United States v. Foster, quoted in part at note
S sqpra.
11 Scheiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 578, 69 N.E.2d 293, 298
(1946); Truttmann v. Truttmann, 328 Ill. 338, 341, 159 N.E. 775, 776 (1927); 2 Wigmore,
Evidence § 501 (3d ed. 1940); Conard, "Mental Examination of Witnesses," 11 Syracuse
L. Rev. 149 (1960). Professor Weihofen has, in an able article showing the greater need
for expert psychiatrists, stated:
That the court has found the witness to possess the minimal degree of capacity to
testify should not foreclose a showing that because of mental defect or disorder his
testimony is so untrustworthy that it should be given little weight. Some disordered
persons, such as the psychopathic liar, may be so convincing that they can easily
pass the test of competency; but it would be unjust to deny the other party the
opportunity to show the existence of the condition and its effect upon reliability of
testimony. Because modern practice admits as competent to testify persons proved
or conceded to be mentally ill to some degree, a liberal admission policy for evidence
on the effect of mental conditions upon credibility is needed.
Weihofen, supra note 1, at 68.
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member.'" Sometimes, in legal use, credibility has a narrow meaning, as
in the interpretation of statutes which require that a will be witnessed by
credible witnesses. In this type of application, the terms "credible" and
"competent" are regarded as synonymous.'" But, more broadly, credibility
is concerned with witnesses who have passed the tests of competency,
which tests show only the capacity of a person to be a witness and not the
capability to testify upon the facts involved in a particular case. Thus,
things which once rendered a witness incompetent may now be used
instead to test his credibility.
If we assume that most people are honest and will try to be truthful, it is
apparent that the greater problems of credibility testing arise in the dis-
covery of error and mistake by witnesses who believe their testimony to be
true. The means of detecting both the fact and the source of error because
of mistake involve a different type of resourcefulness in truth testing than
the direct attack upon perjury.
REFRESHING RECOLLECTION
Reviving recollection is a primary source of correcting mistakes and
supplying omissions in testimony. The oral or written statements made by
a witness prior to the trial are commonly used to revive his dormant
memory. Voice recordings through electronic devices also may be used for
this purpose. A witness who gives what is believed to be inaccurate testi-
mony or who, in answer to a question, may respond that he does not know
the answer or that he has forgotten what he knew, may recall the true
facts if informed of what he has previously said upon the matter. This
requires good faith upon the part of the examiner to use statements to
refresh recollection only when there is a reasonable belief that the state-
ments were in fact made.
The courts are careful in their supervision of the use of notes or memo-
randa by a witness in answering questions put to him. If the witness is too
dependent upon notes, it may indicate that he is reporting what the
writing says rather than expressing his present memory of a past event.
For the purpose of refreshing recollection, a writing cannot itself be used
in evidence, as this would be hearsay. 4 Its sole purpose is to cause the
12 See the many cases collected in Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 749 (1966).
13 See Wallace v. Harrison, 218 Miss. 153, 162, 65 So. 2d 456, 459 (1953), holding that
a statute requiring a will to be attested by two "credible witnesses" requires that the
witnesses be "competent" rather than "credible." But In re Killgore's Estate, 84 Idaho
226, 232, 370 P.2d 512, 516 (1962) held that a statute requiring a lost will to be dearly
and distinctly proved by at least two "credible witnesses" was intended to apply the
common-law rules as to credibility. Ealy v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 265, 319 S.W.2d 710(1958) illustrates another common situation in which there is the requirement that papers
be sworn to by a "credible person." The complaint was challenged because not sworn to
truthfully, but the court held the statute to require only that the affiant be "competent."
14 See 3 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 763.
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witness to correct himself or to become able to give testimony about which
his memory has lapsed. Courts are liberal in permitting the use of former
declarations by a witness to stimulate his present memory, as long as the
statement or writing might reasonably accomplish this result. 5 When the
use of the prior statement has been approved by the court, the opponent
has the right to examine the statement if it be in writing. If he regards the
writing to be inadequate or deceptive, he can offer it in evidence to dis-
credit its effect in reviving the memory.16
Written statements used to refresh recollection are much more freely
approved by the courts than are writings offered as proof of a past recollec-
tion recorded.17 For the court to allow the writing to be used to revive the
memory of a witness, the writing need not have been made contempo-
raneously with the events reported. Nor is it necessary that the particular
written statement was his own writing, nor that it was written for the
purpose of making a record of the events reported.'" The circumstances,
the timing, and the making of the writing are vital only as they reflect
upon his memory of the events. Recognition of this purpose is important
in order to avoid confusion with the rules pertaining to past recollection
recorded. These rules require that the report be contemporaneously made
with the events reported, and that before its use the witness must disclaim
any present recollection of the events, but must recall the making of the
statement as representing accurately his perceptions at the time. 9 The
use of past recollection recorded is much less frequent than the use of
former writings to refresh recollection, and ordinarily such use involves
data rather than narrative observations. If the fact recorded consisted of
figures, such as the numbers on a car seen at a robbery, the making of a
'5 Breeding v. Reed, 253 Iowa 129, 133-35, 110 N.W.2d 552, 555 (1961). In a federal
case the witness was provided with earphones to hear a recording used to refresh his
recollection. United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1959). See also
Beecham v. Burns, 34 Cal. App. 754, 758, 168 Pac. 1058, 1060-61 (Dist. Ct. App. 1917);
Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 277-79, 114 Ati. 126, 127-28 (1921); United States v. Riccardi,
174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949).
16 There is some conflict of authority upon the right of inspection of a memorandum
used to refresh recollection, some decisions being based upon the distinction between
memoranda used to refresh recollection in the courtroom and those used by the witnesses
prior to coming into court. In People v. Scott, 29 Ill. 2d 97, 111, 193 N.E.2d 814, 821-22
(1963), the court saw no reason to draw a distinction and required inspection in both
situations. Contra, State v. Couture, 151 Conn. 213, 218, 196 A.2d 113, 115 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 195 A.2d 174 (1963). In admiralty, the right
to inspect and offer the memorandum in evidence is approved. Petition! of Massachusetts
Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Associates, 200 F. Supp. 625 (ED. Va. 1962). For other authorities
favoring the right of inspection, see Parry-Hill v. Downs, 148 A.2d 715, 717 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1959); McCormick, Evidence § 9 (1954); 3 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 762.
17 For classification and use of prior statements to refresh recollection and as past recol-
lection recorded, see Morgan, "The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory,"
40 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1927).
18 United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947).
19 Jaeger v. flackert, 241 Iowa 379, 382-83, 41 N.W.2d 42, 45 (1950).
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written report recording the numbers would likely be remembered al-
though the facts reported are forgotten. Some courts, however, have
applied the rules pertaining to past recollection recorded to the process
of refreshing recollection.20 New legislation would be valuable in clarify-
ing the requirements of foundation testimony for the admission of each.
The rules pertaining to refreshing recollection are vitally associated
with credibility and the exercise of judgment by the triers of fact upon the
changed or new testimony admitted through this process. If the witness
admits making the former statement and changes his testimony in an
attempt to make it conform to the statement, the triers of fact have sev-
eral choices as to how they will regard the testimony. They may conclude
that the evidence as originally given represented the actual facts. More
probably, they would look upon the new statement as an honest correc-
tion of a misstatement. On the other hand, they might disregard both
statements. It is also possible that the witness will admit making the
former statement but claim that it was incorrect and that the statement
which he has made in court represents the true facts.2" He may support
this claim with an explanation of the difference in his statements. This
may be accepted by the triers, although they could still regard the prior
statement as self-impeachment. However, if the witness admitted making
the statement offered to refresh recollection, but denied that it repre-
sented a true statement of facts, under existing law the triers could not
accept the out-of-court statement as substantive proof, even though they
considered it a true statement of the facts.22 Under these circumstances,
the only function of the statement would be to discredit the testimony of
the witness given in court.
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
The impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements occurs when
the attempt to refresh recollection fails because the witness denies making
the out-of-court statement and extrinsic evidence is admitted to prove that
he did in fact make it. Ordinarily, the party who calls the witness en-
20 Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687, 694-95 (1896). Compare Fanelli v. United States
Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944) with United States v. Rappy, supra note 18.
1 It has been held reversible error to exclude an explanation by the witness of an
inconsistent statement made by him. Henslin v. Wingen, 203 Minn. 166, 280 N.W. 281
(1938); cf. Breeding v. Reed, 253 Iowa 129, 135, 110 N.W.2d 552, 556 (1961); Kellett v.
Wasnie, 261 Minn. 440, 112 N.W.2d 820 (1962). In People v. Williams, 22 I1. 2d 498,
177 N.E.2d 100 (1961), the court permitted the introduction of a statement admitted by
the witness so that it could be clearly brought out and recognized.
22 Tripp v. United States, 295 F.2d 418, 424 (10th Cir. 1961). Only where the statement
in effect constituted an adoptive admission in court could the out-of-court statement be
given substantive effect under prevailing rules. For a thorough discussion, see Schratt v.
Fila, 371 Mich. 238, 123 N.W.2d 780 (1963). See also Hudson v. Smith, 391 S.W.2d 441,
448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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deavors to refresh his memory by inquiry concerning his past contra-
dictory statements. When impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is
used by the adverse party in cross-examination, the primary objective is to
destroy the testimony given in court; there is little hope that the witness
will ever admit, much less acknowledge the correctness of, the out-of-
court statement. Truth testing through this process involves a somewhat
complicated combination of rules, skills, and techniques.
Preliminary analysis of what is known as the Rule of The Queen's
Case2" is required for comprehensive understanding of the use of incon-
sistent statements for impeachment. This 1820 English decision was
widely followed in this country, although repudiated in England by
legislation. However, its complete elimination is certain in the future
development of the law in this country.24
The Rule of The Queen's Case confused the principles applicable to the
best evidence rule with -principles applicable to cross-examination con-
cerning the terms of a writing of the witness, when he is being examined
about the writing only for the purpose of discrediting his testimony given
in court. Under the best evidence rule, where the writing itself is the sub-
ject of inquiry, the proof of the contents of the writing is the document
itself. Inquiry through secondary sources as to its content cannot be made
until it is shown by acceptable proof that the original document is unavail-
able." If, however, the purpose of the examination into the content of the
document is to discredit the witness about matters stated therein, cross-
examination as to whether he wrote it and what he said in it may be a most
effective method of determining his credibility if he denies making the
writing or states its content to be something different than in fact it is.
The Rule of The Queen's Case required that the writing be shown to the
witness before permitting interrogation upon its content, thus eliminating
what may be an effective part of the impeachment. Likewise, in reference
to an oral statement made out of court, counsel on cross-examination may
prefer, for the purpose of impeachment, first to ask the witness what he
had said, if anything, rather than confront him initially with the state-
ment.26 In the situation either of a writing or of an oral statement, if the
23 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (C.P. 1820).
24 For example, the Uniform Rule of Evidence 22(a) permits questioning a witness
about a writing for impeachment purposes without showing it to him. Section 768 of the
California Evidence Code (effective Jan. 1, 1967) provides:
(a) In examining a witness concerning a writing, it is not necessary to show, read,
or disclose to him any part of the writing.
(b) If a writing is shown to a witness, all parties to the action must be given an
opportunity to inspect it before any question concerning it may be asked of the
witness.
25 Lende v. Ferguson, 237 Iowa 738, 746, 23 N.W.2d 824, 829 (1946). Rogers, "The
Best Evidence Rule," 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 278. Uniform Rule of Evidence 70.
26 The cross-examiner would, of course, be taking a risk that the witness would respond
[Vol. 52
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witness were asked what he said before being confronted with the state-
ment, he might give a different story, thus disclosing his desire to evade
the effect of what he had said previously. Whatever the effect of the
divergent answers on his credibility may be, there have been strong
protests against restraints on this type of cross-examination.27
The elimination of the Rule of The Queen's Case would be misleading
if it were interpreted as meaning that it is no longer desirable in most
situations to inform a witness of the content of his prior allegedly incon-
sistent statement before offering extrinsic proof that the statement was
made. The modern trend is to leave this question to the court's discretion,
but in most jurisdictions the rule is that, before proof of the statement or
introduction of the writing, the statement must be made known or the
writing shown to the declarant so that he will have the opportunity to
identify and explain or deny it.28 The Queen's Case, however, dealt only
with the question of timing when the content of the alleged contradictory
declaration should be made known to the declarant; the question of when
proof of the statement should be offered was not involved in that case. The
currently favored procedures make it possible to make the impeaching
testimony more meaningful should the witness deny making the statement
or claim that its contents were different than they in fact are.
A common practice is to proceed as though attempting to refresh the
recollection of the witness, making the content of the statement known to
him; then, if he denies making the statement, proof by extrinsic evidence
may be offered. The detailed steps for impeachment by proof of prior
statements of a witness contradictory to the testimony given in court fit
into a simple formula, easy to follow and more effective in truth testing
than in attempting to do less. A foundation should be laid, identifying the
time, place, occasion, and the person to whom it is claimed the declaration
in question was made. The witness should then be informed of the state-
ment and asked if he made it. Only if he denies making the statement
may those to whom the statement was made be called to present the im-
with a hearsay statement favorable to his opponent which could have been excluded.
Therefore, this procedure is less likely with oral statements than with writings. If confined
to the point upon which impeachment testimony is available, ready for use, it might be
effective to ask the witness what he had said and then confront him with a different
version of the facts which he denies, followed by proof that the impeachment version was
the statement actually made.
27 See, e.g., 4 Wigmore, supra note 11, §§ 1259-63.
28 United States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829, 836 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. People v. Villiams, 22
Ill. 2d 498, 503, 177 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1961); Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev. 453, 456, 386
P.2d 733, 735 (1963); Uniform Rule of Evidence 22(b):
(E]xtrinsic evidence of prior contradictory statements, whether oral or written, made
by the witness, may in the discretion of the judge be excluded unless the witness was




peaching testimony.29 They, too, will be examined in a similar manner
to establish the making of the statement. If the alleged statement was in
writing, it would be shown to the declarant with opportunity to admit or
deny it as his. In event of denial, the writing should be authenticated and
offered in evidence.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence have not made the above procedure a
rigid requirement, but leave it to the discretion of the judge to determine
whether all of the protection afforded through bringing the prior contra-
dictory statements to the attention of the witness while testifying is neces-
sary in the particular case.3 A significant exception applies when the
witness is a party and has made an out-of-court declaration inconsistent
with his testimony. The statement would be used by the adverse party
only if disserving to the declarant and, therefore, is admissible as an ad-
mission. 1 It is substantive evidence requiring no foundation other than
proof of the fact that the statement was made by the party against whom
it is offered.
As a practical trial technique to gain the most from impeaching testi-
mony through the proof of prior inconsistent statements, it is preferable to
follow the procedure of laying the full foundation with a denial by the
witness that he made the statement. If the triers of fact conclude that the
statement was in fact made, the impeachment value is enhanced. The
triers may look upon the denial as an intentional falsification rather than
a failure to remember. The principle of falsa in uno, falsa in omnibus may
29 In Osborne v. McEwan, 194 F. Supp. 117, 118-19 (D.D.C. 1961), Judge Holtzoff com-
mented:
It is the prevailing rule, therefore, that the testimony of a witness may not be
impeached by a contradictory statement said to have been made by him, unless he
was confronted with this statement on cross-examination. The interrogation on cross-
examination must identify the specific statement and indicate its contents, the occa-
sion, and the person to whom it is alleged to have been made. This rule is no mere
technicality. It is vital in the interest of fairness and justice and for the purpose of
eliciting the truth. It helps to combat the "sporting theory of justice."
See also Ayers v. Watson, 132 U.S. 394 (1889); Liberty Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Harrison,
274 Ala. 43, 145 So. 2d 219 (1962); Hancock v. McDonald, 148 So.2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1285, 1293, 130 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1964).
30 Uniform Rule of Evidence 22(b), quoted in note 28 supra. An equally liberal rule
was adopted in California but with more emphasis on the need of providing an opportunity
to the witness to deny or explain his statement. Cal. Evid. Code § 770 (effective Jan. 1,
1967):
Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement
made by a witness that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing
shall be excluded unless: (a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to
give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or (b) The witness
has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action.
31 Schratt v. Fila, 371 Mich. 238, 244-46, 123 N.W.2d 780, 783-84 (1963); Abrainsky v,
Felderbaum, 81 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 194 A.2d 501, 506 (App. Div. 1963); Woodruff v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 52 Ill. App. 2d 341, 202 N.E.2d 113 (1964); Snyder v. Schill, 388
S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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become applicable if there is other evidence indicating intention to
falsify.82
SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
How may the impeaching statements of nonparty witnesses be used by
the triers of fact? Can they be considered as proof of the facts stated in
the declaration, or are they limited only to discrediting the testimony
which the witness has given in court? It is almost the universal view today
that the impeaching statements of a nonparty witness are confined to dis-
crediting the testimony he gives in court. 3 The usual reason given is that
the out-of-court statements are hearsay. In jury trials, the court is
required to give an instruction upon the limitations of their use. 4 But it is
difficult for the jury to follow these limitations effectively. If the jury
concludes that the witness falsified when he denied making the out-of-
court statement, and further believes that statement was true, it is difficult
to expect them simply to consider its impeaching effect and disregard its
substantive content.35
32 See People v. Kennedy, 21 Cal. App. 2d 185, 200, 69 P.2d 224, 232 (1937); Knihal v.
State, 150 Neb. 771, 777, 36 N.W.2d 109, 112 (1949); 29 Neb. L. Rev. 122 (1949).
33 E. L. Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 204 (Sth Cir. 1965); United States v. Duff,
332 F.2d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Barnes, 319 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1963);
People v. Newman, 30 Ill. 2d 419, 197 N.E.2d 12 (1964); People v. Tisdale, 18 App. Div.
2d 274, 239 N.Y.S.2d 226 (4th Dep't 1963); Wininger v. Day, 376 P.2d 206 (Okla. 1962).
34 Bartley v. United States. 319 F.2d 717, 719, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963). There Judge
McGowan said:
The error resides, rather, in the treatment of the statutory purpose for which the
prior inconsistent statement was admissible. This is stated in terms to be that "only of
affecting the credibility of the witness." The differentiation, of course, is between this
rigorously limited objective, and the one of proving as a fact what is contained in
the statement. The crucial character of this distinction has been recognized and
emphasized by this Court....
Without the protection of an admonition or instruction from the court to the
latter end, we cannot say that the jury did not give weight, when it was not entitled
to do so, to the prior written statement and feel itself free to choose between the
conflicting versions.
See also Justice Schaefer's opinion in People v. Tate, 30 Ill. 2d 400, 197 N.E.2d 26 (1964).
35 In United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964),
Judge Friendly, in an able opinion, expressed approval of the use of prior inconsistent
statements for substantive purposes, stating:
The sanctioned ritual seems peculiarly absurd when a witness who has given damaging
testimony on his first appearance at a trial denies any relevant knowledge on his
second; to tell a jury it may consider the prior testimony as reflecting on the veracity
of the later denial of relevant knowledge but not as the substantive evidence that
alone would be pertinent is a demand for mental gymnastics of which jurors are
happily incapable. Beyond this the orthodox rule defies the dictate of common sense that
"the fresher the memory, the fuller and more accurate it is."
Id. at 933. In two thoughtfully considered opinions by Judge Learned Hand, the same
position as that taken by Judge Friendly is strongly supported. Di Carlo v. United States,
6 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1925); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925,
932 (2d Cir. 1957). In accord, Judge Woodbury in Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859, 863
(1st Cir. 1962); Judge Phillips in Curtis v. United States, 67 F.2d 943, 946 (10th Cir.
1933). Judge Doerner in two state cases has applied the same rule. Turner v. Caldwell,
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Under these circumstances, Professor Wigmore would have admitted
the impeaching statement as substantive evidence, on the theory that the
declarant is present in court and is subject to cross-examination under
oath and therefore the purpose of the hearsay rule has been accom-
plished. 6 Most modern thinking points in this direction." The danger of
using the declaration as substantive proof is that it may be a complete
fabrication, as the alleged declarant-witness claimed when he denied
making the statement. This, however, would be equally true if an admis-
sion were fabricated, and would also apply to the use of the statement for
impeachment. If the impeaching statement was not made, it should not be
used for any purpose; if it was made, it should be used for all purposes.
The question of fact as to whether the out-of-court statement was or was
not made is no more difficult than any other question of fact to be decided
by the jury. Although the reasons for permitting the inconsistent declara-
tion to be considered as substantive evidence are strong, the heated feeling
of many against this use prevents a forecast of early change of the limita-
tion. Still, change should eventually come.3
If impeachment statements were to be admitted as substantive evidence,
the rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness would receive a final
death blow, at least as it relates to inconsistent statements . 9 The limita-
tion upon impeachment of a party's own witness still has some life, but
it is being frittered away by statute and by the courts because of its un-
fairness to the examining party in cases of surprise, deceit, and entrap-
ment. Even now a party may show character limitations of his own wit-
nesses if counsel examines in respect to them before the witness testifies
349 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1961); Blanks v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 342 S.W.2d 272,
273 (Mo. 1961). See also Morgan, "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept," 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192-96 (1948); McCormick, Evidence § 39 (1954).
36 3 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 1018.
37 Model Code of Evidence rule 503(b) (1942) is similar to Uniform Rule of
Evidence 63(1), which provides for the admission of "a statement previously made by a
person who is present at the hearing and available for cross examination with respect to
the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made
by declarant while testifying as a witness."
38 The departures of the Model Code from the traditional common-law rules of evidence
were felt by some to be too far reaching and drastic for present day acceptance. The
most criticized area of the Code was the liberalization of the hearsay rule. The draftsmen
of the Uniform Rules, however, still favored a rule which gave substantive effect to
prior out-of-court statements, where the declarant was available for cross-examination.
See note 37 supra.
39 See Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 208 F.2d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 943 (1954). One of the main reasons urged for the rule restricting impeachment
of a party's own witness is that it would enable the examiner to get before the jury out-
of-court statements which might be used by the jury as substantive evidence. Crago v.
State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1922). For discussions see Slough, supra note 1;
Morgan & Maguire, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909,
927-32 (1937); Schatz, "Impeachment of One's Own Witness: Present New York Law
and Proposed Changes," 27 Cornell L.Q. 377 (1942); Ladd, "Impeachment of One's Own
Witness-New Developments," 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1936).
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as to the merits of the case.4 ° The awkward position before the jury of a
party who seeks to show the general testimonial unreliability of his own
witness, after the witness has given damaging testimony, should control
any abuse which might arise if all restrictions were lifted. The party would
not want the triers of fact to feel that he had presented a witness who was
unreliable but did not inform them about it until he was hurt by the
testimony which he gave. Hopefully, then, within a reasonable time all
limitations upon impeachment of a party's own witness will be completely
removed.
LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF IMPEACHING STATEMENTS
The new restrictions on the admissibility of confessions as substantive
proof, represented in Escobedo v. Illinois4l and Miranda v. Arizona,42 also
affect the use of confessions for impeachment purposes-that is, to show
that an accused testified differently from the statements in his confession.
It could be claimed that a confession, if not offered as proof of the facts
stated, might still be used for the limited purpose of testing credibility.
This, however, has not been the position taken by the courts.4 The
philosophy underlying the exclusion of otherwise admissible confessions
obtained in violation of the rights of an accused is equally applicable to the
attempted use of such confessions to impeach his subsequent statements.
For example, the question of admitting an otherwise excludable confes-
sion for impeachment purposes would present the same dangers as would
a practice of permitting the jury to determine the question of admissibility
of a challenged confession. Even if the jury is instructed not to consider
the confession if they decide it does not meet the tests of admissibility,
the confession still becomes known to them. After years of vigorous court
battle, highlighted by Stein v. New York,44 the Supreme Court finally held
40 In Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1931), a witness for the Govern-
ment had been convicted of a felony and when put upon the stand the district attorney
asked questions disclosing his real character before inquiry upon the merits of the case. The
court stated:
His credibility as a witness was an important matter for the jury to decide in order
to get at' the truth, and there is certainly no point in condemning the district attorney
for frankly disclosing at the outset what would enable the jury to do its duty in that
regard. The complaint now made rather savors of the thought that he stole a march
on these defendants in not letting that phase of the matter wait until they could, if
they saw fit, bring out the facts on cross-examination and make the most of their
apparent desire to put the witness in his proper place ....
41 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43 See, e.g., White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People v. Under-
wood, 61 Cal. 2d 113, 120-21 389 P.2d 937, 941, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317 (1964); People v.
Pelkola, 19 I1. 2d 156, 161-62, 166 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1960); State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M.
241, 249-54, 354 P.2d 533, 539-43 (1960). Compare Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d
867, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
44 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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in Jackson v. Denno45 that admissibility of a confession must be decided
by the court alone. The basis of this decision is distrust of the capacity
of a jury to segregate the admissibility and proof functions.46 For the
same reason, the Court surely would not permit the jury to hear an ob-
jectionable confession even with an instruction that it could be used to
impeach but was not itself to be believed.
Another troublesome, but proper, limitation upon the introduction of
extrinsic evidence of statements for the purpose of impeachment is the
requirement that the impeachment be upon a material matter. Confusion
exists, however, as to what the borderline of materiality should be. It is
clear that if the evidence sought to be impeached is not harmful to the
party offering the impeaching testimony, the time of the court should not
be wasted in permitting impeachment.4 7 Also, a statement by a witness that
he does not know the answer to a question asked about a particular event
is ordinarily not regarded as testimony which may be impeached by inde-
pendent proof of a declaration made by him disclosing full knowledge.48
This is because material evidence adverse to the examiner has not been
given, and therefore impeachment would serve no purpose other than to
introduce the hearsay statement of the witness.49 Without more foundation
testimony, the denial of knowledge creates no material facts justifying
impeachment. However, if circumstances are proved showing a prob-
ability that, if the events had occurred, the witness would have seen them,
the denial of knowledge of the facts creates an inference that the events
did not occur. In this situation, the proof of a previous declaration by the
witness stating the happening of the event ought to be admissible to im-
peach this inference. As in other impeachment situations, the court could
inform the triers that the impeachment statement could not be used as
proof of the facts stated. Furthermore, if there were no other evidence of
the happening of the event, there would be no danger of admitting the
statement as the case would fail because of insufficient proof.50 If, how-
ever, other evidence of the event were in the record, the impeaching state-
ment would be important to destroy the inference created by the dis-
45 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
46 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 381 (1964).
47 Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281, 283-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
831 (1965); Hicks v. M.K. & 0. Transit Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 236 (Okla. 1961); Crago v.
State, 28 Wyo. 215, 225, 202 Pac. 1099, 1102 (1922).
48 Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482, 486-87, 194 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1963)
(dictum); cf. State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Mo. 1965). But see People v. Bush,
29 Ill.2d 367, 372, 194 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 966 (1964).
49 People v. Welch, 16 App. Div. 2d 554, 558, 229 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913-14 (4th Dep't
1962).
50 E.g., Comer v. State, 222 Ark. 156, 257 S.W.2d 564 (1953).
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claimer of knowledge, which would otherwise weigh against the proof of
the happening of the event.
The kind of materiality which will permit impeachment consists basi-
cally of two types: first, facts dealing with the substantive issues as dis-
closed by the pleadings,51 and second, facts showing bias, prejudice,
interest, or the willingness of the witness to be unscrupulous in giving
testimony. The common qualification is that a witness cannot be im-
peached upon a collateral matter. The term "collateral" expresses a
general idea but is not very helpful in the application of the rule. If the
statement sought to be impeached is consequential to the determination
of the litigated issues or if it is a vital factor in its influence upon the out-
come of a trial, the Lttempt to impeach it should escape this "collateral-
matter" exclusion.
In Ewing v. United States,52 Justice Rutledge ably discussed the ad-
missibility of inconsistent statements concerning the bias of a witness who
had otherwise testified upon matters material to the issues on trial, and
stated that "it is not merely matters which are a 'part of the case' that may
be the subject of a self-contradiction, but any matter which would have
been btherwise admissible in evidence."53 Though it might be broadly
stated that any fact which is relevant in evidence for any purpose other
than mere contradiction itself may.be shown in evidence, whether a
matter is material or collateral is- essentially a question of degree. No
formula can articulate every application of the rule.
It is important to observe that this limitation upon impeachment by
extrinsic evidence does not necessarily preclude examination of a witness
as to collateral matters which have marginal relevancy. However, the
examiner is confined to the answer given and cannot introduce evidence
that the witness once spoke otherwise."
A final observation about the limitations on impeaching statements is
that the degree of inconsistency must be real.5  When the statements are
placed side by side, it must be possible to say that both cannot be true.
Only in this circumstance will the triers have reason to nullify the testi-
mony given in court, which is the only justification for the admissibility
of the out-of-court statement. Should an impeaching statement be given
substantive effect, it would have to be material to be admissible.
51 Phillips v. Mooney, 126 A.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956); cf. State v.
McHenry, 207 Iowa 760, 771, 223 N.W. 535, 541 (1929).
52 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943).
53 Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
776 (1943).
54 Fleetwood v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 163, 174-75, 241 P.2d 962, 974 (1952).
55 McElhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 309 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1958).
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In requiring that impeachment be upon material issues, the future need
of the law is one of clarification. Generally, the rules limiting impeachment
are sound. They are desirable to control the length of trials and, with all of
the complications that arise in a trial, to help prevent the trials from
diverting their attention from the main issues.56
INCONSISTENT OPINION AND IMPEACHMENT
The introduction of a witness' prior declaration of inconsistent opinion
to impeach his testimony is regarded as objectionable by some courts.57
As a result, only inconsistent statements of fact may be used for impeach-
ment purposes. The principle underlying this rule is that it is for the
witness to testify as to facts and for the jury to draw conclusions. How-
ever, this rule is misapplied when used to exclude proof of the declaration
of an inconsistent opinion offered only for the purpose of discrediting
testimony the declarant gives in court. This evidence, if admitted, enables
the triers of fact to check and evaluate testimony given in court by the
expressed opinion of the witness, which opinion could only arise from the
state of mind of one having an entirely different version of the facts.58 The
declaration of an inconsistent opinion may, in some instances, be more
indicative of the weakness of the testimony than a statement of incon-
sistent facts,59 and hence it may be more valuable for purposes of impeach-
ment. The danger that the jury will use the inconsistent opinion as proof
is no greater than the danger of using, the inconsistent statement as sub-
stantive evidence. Considering the many places in which evidence ex-
cludable for one purpose is admissible for another, the reason favoring
admissibility of declarations of inconsistent opinion should over-balance
the possibility of misuse. Today courts are generally much more liberal in
the use of opinion testimony than they have been in the past. Lay witnesses
56 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 104 Ga. App. 554, 122 S.E.2d 268 (1961).
The Uniform Rules of Evidence attempted to solve the problem of preventing a trial from
getting out of hand through the injection of collateral issues of limited value by giving
the judge discretion to exclude admissible evidence. Rule 45 provides:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading thejury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
57 Ewing v. United States, supra note 53, at 643-44 (Groner, C. J., concurrinf in the
result); State v. Baker, 233 Iowa 745, 8 N.W.2d 248 (1943). For a contrary view see
Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Eddins, 177 F.2d 954, 956-58 (4th Cir. 1949); Crawford v.
Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 368, 31 S.W.2d 618 (1930); see 3 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 1041.
58 See Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Webb v.
City of Seattle, 22 Wash. 2d 596, 604-11 157 P.2d 312, 316-19 (1945); Bright v. Wheelock,
323 Mo. 840, 868-69 20 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1929).
59 See Grady, "The Admissibility of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeach-
ment," 41 Cornell L.Q. 224 (1956).
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are permitted to communicate their personal perceptions in the language of
inference or opinion where it is difficult to communicate factually. Expert
witnesses are permitted to express their opinions upon the ultimate facts in
issue without invading the province of the jury.60 In light of the modem
trend in respect to opinion testimony and the realization that the triers of
fact must always make the final fact decisions, it is strange to continue the
unrealistic limitation upon impeachment by proof of a former declaration
of an inconsistent opinion.
CONSISTENT STATEMENTS To SUSTAIN A WITNESS
Consistent statements of a witness, when admitted, are used to sustain
his credibility concerning testimony given in court, but are not used inde-
pendently to prove the truth of that which has been stated. Such state-
ments are used to show that the witness spoke truthfully when he testified
and that his testimony was neither a recent fabrication nor the result of
intervening experiences creating bias.61 The ultimate result is practically
the same as if the consistent statement itself were used as a direct means
to corroborate the testimony given in court. If the triers would accept the
testimony given in court except for occurrences throwing doubt on the
credibility of the witness, a consistent statement made by him before the
reason to falsify occurred would both restore faith in the witness and
belief in what he said. The rationale is directed only to the issue of
credibility.62 For instance, if a witness to an accident married the defen-
dant's daughter before the trial, his consistent declaration about what he
had seen, made before he met the daughter, would be admissible to dispel
any claim that the testimony given in court was distorted because of his
new-found love.
There are several views on the issue of admissibility of a prior con-
sistent statement when the only attack upon the witness is proof of a prior
inconsistent statement." If there is no other evidence to support a claim
that the witness colored his testimony, a prior consistent statement is held
60 Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 342-45, 5 N.W.2d 646, 654-56
(1942); McCormick, "Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony,"
23 Texas L. Rev. 109, 117 (1945); Ladd, "Expert Testimony," 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 416-17
(1952); Ladd, "Expert and Other Opinion Testimony," 40 Minn. L. Rev. 437, 441-44
(1956).
61 People v. Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1949), 35 Cornell L.Q.
867 (1950). See Note, "Admissibility of Prior Statements To Corroborate Testimony," 17
Va. L. Rev. 696 (1931).
6- Sweazey v. Valley Transp., Inc., 6 Wash. 2d 324, 332-33, 107 P.2d 567, 571-72 (1940).
48 For examples of two possible approaches see Loser v. E. R. Bacon Co., 201 Cal. App.
2d 387, 20 Cal. Rptr. 221 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Huston v. Hanson, 353 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.




by most courts to be inadmissible.64 The fact that a witness related the
facts twice the same way would add little, if anything, to assist the triers in
determining the effect of the attempt to impeach by proof of an incon-
sistent statement where no fabrication or bias is claimed. The decision on
credibility cannot be based upon a calculation of whether consistent state-
ments were made more often than inconsistent ones.
CREDIBILITY TESTING-A MULTIPLE PROCESS
The famous case of Jencks v. United States" has had a great impact
upon the whole subject of impeachment testimony. In that case the Su-
preme Court regarded the use of inconsistent statements of witnesses to
disprove their testimony to be of such importance that it ordered a new
trial where the accused had been denied the production of certain papers
for examination as to their inconsistent content. The Court stated that it
was error for the trial court to deny production on the ground that the
papers were privileged as government secrets.6 The widespread criticism
caused by the Jencks case led to congressional legislation limiting uncon-
trolled fishing expeditions into government records, but still requiring their
production when there should be opportunity to check the testimony of
government witnesses against contradictory statements made by them in
reports held by governmental agencies. 67
Solving questions of truth or falsity and of accuracy or mistake brings
into play a number of facets of testimonial investigation, many of which
are closely interrelated, and which in appropriate situations may be joined
together for effective results. Some of the same factors which cause a
witness, whose character for veracity is bad, to give perjured testimony
may cause another witness whose character is good to make mistakes.
Truth testing involves a consideration of the multiple effect of character,
motive, contradiction, intelligence, knowledge, quality of memory, friendly
or hostile feeling toward the parties, interest, bias and prejudice-all of
which give insight into the probability of reliable testimony.6" In addition
64 United States v. Leggett, 312 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1962); Wofford Beach Hotel,
Inc. v. Glass, 170 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Kesselring v. Hummer, 130
Iowa 145, 148-50, 106 N.W. 501, 502 (1906).
65 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
e6 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1957).
67 Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The act, although a limitation upon complete
exposure of governmental records, feared as a result of the Jencks' decision, also recognizes
the importance of inconsistent statements in securing a fair trial. See Williams v. United
States, 338 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1964), 5 A.L.R.3d 746 (1966) for a broad interpretation of
the act permitting impeachment.
. 68 See United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 388-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), quoted in part
at note 5 supra; Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 776 (1943); People v. James, 218 Cal. App. 2d 166, 172-74, 32 Cal. Rptr. 283,
287-88 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (evidence admitted of alcoholism and of drinking at time of
the event); State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 621-26, 289 N.W. 575, 577-78 (1940); Kubie,
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to these qualitative areas of inquiry the candor and forthrightness of the
witness, his hesitancy or willingness to testify, his evasion or concealment,
his poise or frustration, and his emotional reaction to questions indicated
through his demeanor and conduct on the witness stand also aid in deter-
mining the credit to be given his testimony.69
In many criminal and most civil cases, direct evidence upon character
traits is not used, although where used, its significance is often great. If
a direct attack is not made upon character, to show that, in relation to
credibility, it is bad, direct evidence of good character cannot be intro-
duced.7 This rule limits the use of character evidence on the issue of
veracity, especially when reputation is considered to be the only means of
proof other than prior criminal convictions of the witness.71 The absence of
direct character evidence, however, does not mean that the character
aspects of the truthfulness of the witness are overlooked or are unim-
portant, but only that other sources must be used to judge credibility.
The process and source of truth testing varies from case to case and
with each witness. The perspective of a witness may be influenced by who
the parties are, what the issues involve, and whether the action is civil or
criminal; these factors may therefore have a vital bearing upon the
reliability of what he says. The personal experiences, mental attitude, and
interests of a witness are often reflected in what he observes, what he
remembers, and how he communicates.72 Observations may be controlled
by what the witness, consciously or unconsciously, wants to see as well as
by his opportunity to perceive. Events, however, may be so clear and
definite that honest distortion could not occur.7 3 Particularly when wit-
"Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory," 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 59 (1959); Hutchins & Slesinger, "Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
The Competency of Witnesses," 37 Yale LJ. 1017 (1928); Note, 13 Rutgers L. Rev.
330 (1958); see also Clark v. Geiger, 31 F.R.D. 268, 271 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (court refused
to prohibit taking of deposition of allegedly incompetent person, but allowed other party
to select a psychiatrist to be present to observe demeanor during taking of deposition
and to testify at trial on question of competency and credibility); State v. Butler, 27
N.J. 560, 598-605, 143 A.2d 530, 552-56 (1958); Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 181 Pa.
Super, 630, 637 n.2, 124 A.2d 693, 697 n.2 (1956).
09 Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952); Rains v. Rains, 17 N.J.
Misc. 310, 8 A.2d 715 (Ch. 1939), rev'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 328, 12 A.2d 857 (1940); Hale, "Bias
as Affecting Credibility," 1 Hastings L.J. 1 (1949); see generally Ladd, "On the Witness
Stand," in Perkins, Elements of Police Science 91-110 (1942); Keeton, Trial Tactics and
Methods ch. 3 (1954).
70 Colker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 224 Ky 837, 847, 7 S.W.2d 502, 506 (1928);
People v. Tolewitzke, 332 Mich. 455, 457, 52 N. W. 2d 184, 185 (1952).
71 For criticisms of this view, see Ladd, "Techniques and Theory of Character Testi-
mony," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 498, 507-18 (1939).
72 Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 128, 113 Pac. 147, 150-51 (1910) ; Weihofen, "Testimonial
Competence and Credibility," 34 Geo.iWash. L. Rev. 53, 59-60 (1965).
73 Evje v. City Title Ins. Co., 120 kCal. App. 2d 488, 492, 261 P.2d 279, 280 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1953). Uniform Rules of Evidence 19 provides that "the judge may reject the testi-
mony of a witness that he perceived a matter if he finds that no trier of fact could
reasonably believe that the witness ditl perceive the matter."
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nesses are the parties there is a tendency to see things that are favorable
and discount or overlook things that are unfavorable. 74 This is why an
attorney must be careful, in cross-examining his own client before trial,
to get the full story by asking what the adverse party will claim the facts
to be. Moreover, a nonparty witness willing to help a friend may, through
omission, imaginative expansion, or planned distortion, supply needed
testimony.75 A witness whose conscience prevents a complete fabrication
may be less disturbed by a false answer that he does not remember when
questions are asked calling for damaging testimony.
Cross-examination on relevant matters affecting human behavior and
on the opportunities for the witness to know the facts constitutes the most
practical and reliable means of exposing falsity and error.76 Scientific
devices such as the lie detector, truth serum, and the clinical study of a
psychiatrist may be helpful in the investigative steps in some cases, but
these have had very limited courtroom use.7 7 The use of psychiatrists in
determining competency of witnesses with mental disabilities is already
a common practice, and greater use of psychiatrists is sure to be made in
respect to the capabilities of subnormal witnesses who are called to testify.
Lawyers can learn much from the psychiatrists in respect to the relevant
areas of inquiry in determining the mental health of their patients. It is
surprising how many of the questions to be explored in considering
whether a patient has a psychopathic personality or is a social deviate of
one kind or another are similar to the points of inquiry to which question-
ing is directed by a skilled lawyer in determining the credibility of the
ordinary witness. The growing interest of lawyers in psychiatry and of
psychiatrists in the law is sure to be productive of better understanding by
each of the other, and to increase the use of psychiatrists in the class of
cases where their services can be most helpful.78
However, even assuming that much more assistance may be given, it
74 Gross v. Rubbo, 133 Conn. 639, 53 A.2d 653 (1947); State v. Robbins, 35 Wash.
2d 389, 395, 213 P.2d 310, 315 (1950).
75 United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 388-89 (S.DX.Y. 1949);
76 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931).
77 See United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); State v. Lowry, 163
Kan. 622, 625-30, 185 P.2d 147, 149-52 (1947); Note, 29 Cornell L.Q. 535 (1944);
McCormick, Evidence § 174 (1954). Upon the probative value of psychiatric opinion
evidence on credibility, see Falknor & Steffen, "Evidence of Character: From the 'Crucible
of the Community' to the 'Couch of the Psychiatrist,'" 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 980 (1954).
78 Diamond & Louisell, "The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations," 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1335, 1338-40 (1965); juviler, "Psychiatric Opinions as
to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach," 48 Calif. L. Rev. 648 (1960); Magnus,
"Psychiatric Evidence in the Common Law Courts," 17 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1965). But see
Roberts, "Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist," 1965 Wis. L.
Rev. 240; Sargent, 'Problems in Collaboration Between Lawyer and Psychiatrist," 11
Wayne L. Rev. 697 (1965). Weihofen, supra note 72; see also Guttmacher & Weihofen,
Psychiatry and the Law ch. 15 (1952).
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is improbable that psychiatrists will ever be used to express their views on
each and all of the witnesses called in a trial, or that such a development
could serve a useful purpose. The experience, skills, techniques, and
resourcefulness of the trial lawyer in the examination and stringent cross-
examination of witnesses must be relied upon to detect mistakes and
intentional false swearing. If a web of contradictions is found, along with
other clouding influences or motivating circumstances which, judged in
the light of human experience, would be likely to cause distortions, then
the weaknesses in the quality of the witness and his testimony become
apparent.7 9 No testing method is isolated and sufficient in itself; rather,
each operates in combination with others to develop a total picture of facts
from which reasonable conclusions may be drawn.
Some of the specific areas of inquiry used as a source of clues to what
influences a witness' testimony will clarify the general observations above.
In criminal cases, fear may cause a prosecuting witness to change his
story completely, or to claim a want of memory. Inquiry into threats,
duress, or attempts to tamper with the witness may be very revealing, and
are proper subjects on cross-examination to determine credibility. 0 If the
witness himself has done the tampering, his conduct causes his testimony
to have little value."'
The relationship between a witness and a party, such as employer and
employee, debtor and creditor, kinship, common membership in organiza-
tions showing close association and affiliation of views, and even improper
relations, tends in varying degrees to show the character of the testi-
mony." Whether a witness is partisan is a basic inquiry which, in company
with other facts, is valuable as a truth-testing device. Parties to litigation
always have an interest in its outcome, but this does not mean that their
testimony is necessarily false or mistaken. The accused in a criminal case
has the greatest self-interest, but this does not mean that his defense is not
true. Although interest has been generally eliminated as a ground of in-
competency, the dead-man statutes still retain the rule of incompetency
with regard to interested persons in an action against the estate of a
deceased person. As objectionable as these statutes are, they represent a
79 La Jolla Casa deManana v. Hopkins, 98 Cal. App. 2d 339, 345-47, 219 P.2d 871,
876-77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950). The observations of Professor Weinstein in "Some Dif-
ficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in judicial Trials," 66 Colum. L.
Rev. 223, 232-41 (1966), show the influence of societal assumptions and values as it
relates to the triers of fact in their conscious or unconscious evidential evaluations.
80 Cf. Ware v. State, 204 Miss. 107, 37 So. 2d 18 (1948).
81 State v. Hakon, 21 N.D. 133, 129 N.W. 234 (1910).
82 Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, 35 So. 142 (1903) ; Godfrey v. State, 185 Miss. 70, 187
So. 199 (1939) ; Eden v. Klaas, 166 Neb. 354, 362-63, 89 N.W.2d 74, 81 (1958) ; Henderson
v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 568-70, 191 Pac. 442, 452-53 (1919); Hellstrom v. First Guar.
Blank, 54 N.D. 166, 177-78, 209 N.W. 212, 216 (1926).
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firm belief among some members of the bar that there is a tendency to give
false testimony when the adverse party is not living to dispute it.8s The
answer to this is that recognition by the jury of the interest of the witness
would be a sufficient safeguard against false testimony if the party were
made competent to testify.
If a witness for the state in a criminal case is to receive a reward in the
event of conviction, the triers should surely know this fact in testing his
credibility.84 For the same reason, an expert witness may be asked how
much he was paid to make his investigation and testify in court.85 Volun-
tary assistance through contribution to the expense of litigation would
cause a witness to be judged as more than ordinarily concerned in the
outcome of the case." The fact that a witness has testified for the same
party in other cases, or that he is himself a party in another action where
the same questions are involved, are also important facts for the triers to
know.8 7
Although customarily considered to be direct proof, physical facts and
demonstrative evidence are among the most effective aids in proving
mistakes and exposing fabrication. 8 Since the showing of the true facts
repudiates the false, a falsification cannot possibly stand in the face of
physical facts which disprove it.' Thus, a moving picture of a person
engaging actively in a tennis match would destroy pretty quickly a false
claim of physical incapacity. 0 Similarly, circumstantial evidence, by
creating logical inferences, may indicate that the facts are not as otherwise
claimed to be. 1 Inherent improbability alone may afford a reason for
disregarding uncontradicted testimony.
83 A number of commentators have criticized the rule and its rationale. See, e.g., Maguire,
"Witnesses-Suppression of Testimony by Reason of Death," 6 Am. U.L. Rev. 1 (1957);
Ray, "The Dead Man's Statute-A Relic of the Past." 10 Sw. LJ. 390, 395-99 (1956);
Ladd, "The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative Proposal,"
26 Iowa L. Rev. 207, 229-40 (1941); Ladd, "Admission of Evidence Against Estates of
Deceased Persons," 19 Iowa L. Rev. 521 (1934). Modern Legislation abolishing the rule
admits the testimony of interested witnesses against the estate of the deceased and
provides protection to the estate by admitting the hearsay declarations made by the
deceased. Uniform Rule 7 and Model Code rule 9 eliminate the old exclusion, and decedent's
declarations are considered under different exceptions to the hearsay rule.
84 Harris v. United States, 169 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 872 (1948).
85 State Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 405-07, 281 P.2d 707,
712-13 (1955) (dictum).
86 Henderson v. State, 94 Fla. 318, 333-35, 113 So. 689, 695 (1927).
87 Horton v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry., 46 Tex. Civ. App. 639, 643-44, 103 S.W. 467,
469 (Ct. Civ. App. 1907).
88 See McNamer v. American Ins. Co., 267 Wis. 494, 499-502, 66 N.W.2d 342, 344-46
(1954).
89 Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. Mayo, 20 F. Supp. 698, 701-02 (W.D. La. 1935);
Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, 234-35, 266 N.W. 341, 342-43 (1936).
90 Heiman v. Market St. Ry., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 314-16, 69 P.2d 178, 180-81 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937); Sweet, "The Motion Picture as a Fraud Detector," 21 A..A.J. 653 (1935).91 Edwards v. Washkuhn, 11 Wash. 2d 425, 433-36, 119 P.2d 905, 912-13 (1941); Dale




The many ramifications of the means employed in the law to correct
mistakes and expose false swearing show a dependency upon lawyers to
bring to light matters which will enable the triers of fact to determine
credibility. The Uniform Rules, in expressing an open-door policy for the
admission of evidence, simply provide, subject to certain limitations, that
[F]or the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness,
any party including the party calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter
relevant upon the issues of credibility.92
It is left to the lawyer to find and to use whatever is relevant to determine
credibility. Though this problem concerns the intangible, nothing could
be more real.
A significant observation comes from the Gideon93 through Miranda94
line of cases which recognize the high position and responsibility of the
lawyer as both advocate and counselor. These cases place new emphasis
upon the need for able trial lawyers if just results are to be obtained in
the determination of a trial. It is true that every case should be decided
upon the merits-that the facts alone can be the basis of a just decision.
The difficulty lies in determining what the facts are. The law does not
make the situations with which it deals; they are the product of people
and society. In our adversary system of trial, each party, in an effort to
sustain his own case, is expected to bring to light every relevant fact and
consideration so that impartial triers of fact will have the opportunity to
exercise a wise and corre6t judgment in rendering a decision. The best
method of solving the credibility problem is to build a case so strong that
it repels falsity and mistake, but this again is a question of what the facts
are and how they may be proved. The law of evidence, of which credibility
is but one of many essential parts, points to proof possibilities and controls
their use. Credibility, therefore, is the lawyer's problem. It is his under-
standing of human behavior, his resourcefulness in discovering the
motivating factors having a probability of influencing testimony, and his
ability of comparative analysis in evaluating testimony in light of all the
evidence in a trial that must be relied upon to secure a just solution to
factual controversies. Improved rules of evidence should be designed to
give the lawyer greater freedom to achieve this goal.
92 Uniform Rule of Evidence 20.
93 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
94 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see notes 41-46 supra.
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